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Abstract
In this article we review Tononi’s (2008) theory of conscious-
ness as integrated information. We argue that previous formal-
izations of integrated information (e.g. Griffith, 2014) depend
on information loss. Since lossy integration would necessi-
tate continuous damage to existing memories, we propose it is
more natural to frame consciousness as a lossless integrative
process and provide a formalization of this idea using algo-
rithmic information theory. We prove that complete lossless
integration requires noncomputable functions. This result im-
plies that if unitary consciousness exists, it cannot be modelled
computationally.
Keywords: Consciousness; integrated information; synergy;
data compression; modularity of mind.
Introduction
Continuing advances in neuroscience are allowing precise
neural correlates of different aspects of consciousness to be
uncovered. For example, damage to certain areas of the
cortex has been shown to impair the experience of color,
while other lesions can interfere with the perception of shape
(Tononi, 2008). The hard question that remains is understand-
ing how these neural correlates combine to give rise to sub-
jective experiences.
Tononi’s (2008) integrated information theory provides a
theoretical framework which allows this issue to be mean-
ingfully addressed. The theory proposes that consciousness
is an information processing phenomenon and can thus be
quantified in terms of a systems’ organizational structure,
specifically its capacity to integrate information. According
to Tononi, what we mean when we say that the human brain
produces consciousness is that it integrates information, thus
producing behaviour which reflects the actions of a unified,
singular system.
Tononi (2008) explains the foundations of his theory
through two thought experiments, which we adapt slightly
here. The first thought experiment establishes the require-
ment for a conscious observation to generate information.
The second establishes the requirement for a conscious obser-
vation to be integrated with previous memories, hence gener-
ating integrated information.
Requirement 1: Generating Information
Let’s imagine that a factory producing scented candles in-
vests in an artificial smell detector. The detector is used for
sampling the aroma of the candles passing on the conveyor
belt below and directing them to the appropriate boxes. Let’s
suppose that the factory is currently producing two flavors of
scented candle: chocolate and lavender. In this case the de-
tector only needs to distinguish between two possible smells.
A batch of chocolate scented candles is passed underneath
and the sensor flashes chocolate. Can we say that the detec-
tor has actually experienced the smell of chocolate? Clearly
it has managed to distinguish chocolate from lavender, but
this does not guarantee that it has experienced the full aroma
in the same manner as humans do. For example, it may be
the case that the detector is latching onto a single molecule
that separates the two scents, ignoring all other aspects. The
distinction between chocolate and lavender is a binary one,
and can thus be encoded by a single bit. In contrast, humans
can distinguish more than 10,000 different smells detected
by specialized olfactory receptor neurons lining the nose (Al-
berts et al., 2008). When a human identifies a smell as choco-
late they are generating a response which distinguishes be-
tween 10,000 possible states, yielding log2 10,000= 13.3 bits
of information.
The important point that Tononi (2008) raises with his ini-
tial thought experiment is that the quality of an experience is
necessarily expressed relative to a range of alternative pos-
sibilities. For example, if the whole world was coloured the
same shade of red, the act of labeling an object as ‘red’ would
hold no meaning. The informativeness of ‘red’ depends on its
contrast with other colours. Descriptions of experiences must
be situated within a context where they discriminate among
many alternatives (i.e. they must generate information).
Requirement 2: Generating Integrated Information
Tononi’s (2008) second thought experiment establishes that
information alone is not sufficient for conscious experience.
Imagine that the scented candle factory enhances the arti-
ficial smell detector so that now it can distinguish between
1 million different smells, even more than the human nose.
Can we now say that the detector is truly smelling chocolate
when it outputs chocolate, given that it is producing more in-
formation than a human? What is the difference between the
detector’s experience and the human experience?
Like the human nose, the artificial smell detector uses spe-
cialized olfactory receptors to diagnose the signature of the
scent and then looks it up in a database to identify the appro-
priate response. However, each smell is responded to in iso-
lation of every other. The exact same response to a chocolate
scent occurs even if the other 999,999 entries in the database
are deleted. The factory might as well have purchased a mil-
lion independent smell detectors and placed them together
in the same room, each unit independently recording and re-
sponding to its own data.
According to Tononi (2008), the information generated by
such a system differs from that generated by a human insofar
as it is not integrated. Because it may as well be composed
of individual units, each with the most limited repertoire, an
unintegrated set of responses cannot yield a subjective expe-
rience. To bind the repertoire, a system must generated in-
tegrated information. Somehow, the response to the smell of
chocolate must be encoded in terms of its relationship with
other experiences.
Consciousness as Integrated Information
Inside the human nose there are different neurons which are
specialized to respond to particular smells. The process of
detection is not itself integrated. For example, with selective
damage to certain olfactory receptors a person could conceiv-
ably lose their ability to smell chocolate while retaining their
ability to smell lavender. However, the human experience
of smell is integrated as regards the type of information it
records in response.
According to Tononi’s (2008) theory, when somebody
smells chocolate the effect that it has on their brain is inte-
grated across many aspects of their memory. Let’s consider,
for example, a human observer named Amy who has just ex-
perienced the smell of chocolate. A neurosurgeon would find
it very difficult to operate on Amy’s brain and eliminate this
recent memory without affecting anything else. According
to the integrated information theory, the changes caused by
her olfactory experience are not localised to any one part of
her brain, but are instead widely dispersed and inextricably
intertwined with all the rest of her memories, making them
difficult to reverse. This unique integration of a stimulus with
existing memories is what gives experiences their subjective
(i.e. observer specific) flavour. This is integrated information.
In contrast, deleting the same experience in the case of an
artificial smell detector would be easy. Somewhere inside the
system is a database with discrete variables used to maintain
the detection history. These variables can simply be edited to
erase a particular memory. The information generated by the
artificial smell detector is not integrated. It does not influence
the subsequent information that is generated. It lies isolated,
detached and dormant.
The same reasoning can be used to explain why a video
camera, which generates plenty of information, remains un-
conscious, in contrast to a person viewing the same scene.
The memories generated by the video camera can be easily
edited independently of each other. For example, I can de-
cide to delete all of the footage recorded yesterday between
2pm and 4pm. In contrast, a person viewing the same scenes
encodes information in an integrated fashion. I cannot delete
Amy’s memories from yesterday because all of her memo-
ries from today have already been influenced by them. The
two sets of memories cannot easily be disentangled. When it
comes to human consciousness it is not possible to identify
any simple divisions or disjoint components.
What Tononi’s (2008) theory proposes is that when peo-
ple use the term ‘consciousness’ to describe the behaviour of
an entity they have the notion of integrated information in
mind. We attribute the property of being conscious to sys-
tems whose responses cannot easily be decomposed or disin-
tegrated into a set of causally independent parts. In contrast,
when we say that a video camera is unconscious, what we
mean is that the manner in which it responds to visual stimuli
is unaffected by the information it has previously recorded.
Quantifying Integrated Information
Tononi (2008) seeks to formalize the measurement of inte-
grated information. His central idea is to quantify the infor-
mation generated by the system as a whole above and beyond
the information generated independently by its parts. For in-
tegrated information to be high, a system must be connected
in such a way that information is generated by causal interac-
tions among rather than within its parts.
Assuming that the brain generates high levels of integrated
information, this implies that the encoding of a stimulus must
be deeply connected with other existing information in the
brain. We now address the question of what form of process-
ing might enable such integrated information to arise.
Griffith (2014) rebrands the informational difference be-
tween a whole and the union of its parts as ‘synergy’. He
presents the XOR gate as the canonical example of synergistic
(i.e. integrated) information. Consider, for example, a XOR
gate with two inputs, X1 and X2, which can be interpreted as
representing a stimulus and an original brain state. They com-
bine integratively to yield Y , the resultant brain state which
encodes the stimulus. Given X1 and X2 in isolation we have
no information about Y . The resultant brain state Y can only
be predicted when both components are taken into account at
the same time. Given that the components X1 and X2 do not
have any independent causal influence on Y , all of the infor-
mation about Y here is integrated.
One issue with presenting the XOR gate as the canonical
example of synergistic information is that it is lossy. A two
bit input is reduced to a single bit output, meaning that half
the entropy has been irretrievably lost. If the brain integrated
information in this manner, the inevitable cost would be the
destruction of existing information. While it seems intuitive
for the brain to discard irrelevant details from sensory input,
it seems undesirable for it to also hemorrhage meaningful
content. In particular, memory functions must be vastly non-
lossy, otherwise retrieving them repeatedly would cause them
to gradually decay.
We propose that the information integration evident in cog-
nition is not lossy. In the following sections we define a form
of synergy, based on data compression, which does not rely
on the destruction of information, and subsequently explore
its implications.
Data Compression as Integration
Data compression is the process by which an observation is
reduced by identifying patterns within it. For example the
sequence 4,6,8,12,14,18,20,24 . . . can be simplified as the
description “odd prime numbers +1”. The latter representa-
tion is shorter than the original sequence, hence it evidences
data compression.
A close link exists between data compression and predic-
tion. Levin’s (1974) Coding Theorem demonstrates that, with
high probability, the most likely model that explains a set of
observations is the most compressed one. In addition, for
any predictable sequence of data, the optimal prediction of
the next item converges quickly with the prediction made by
the model which has the simplest description (Solomonoff,
1964). As per Occam’s razor, concise models make fewer
assumptions and are thus more likely to be correct.
These insights lay the foundation for a deep connection
between data compression, prediction and understanding, a
theoretical perspective on intelligence and cognisance which
we refer to as ‘compressionism’. Adopting this perspec-
tive, Maguire and Maguire (2010) propose that the binding
of information we associate with consciousness is achieved
through sophisticated data compression carried out in the
brain, suggesting a link between this form of processing and
Tononi’s (2008) notion of information integration.
In the case of an uncompressed string, every bit carries in-
dependent information about the string. In contrast, when a
text file is compressed to the limit, each bit in the final rep-
resentation is fully dependent on every other bit for its sig-
nificance. No bit carries independent information about the
original text file. For an uncompressed file, damaging the
first bit leaves you with a 50% chance of getting the first bit
right and 100% chance of getting the rest of the bits right.
For an optimally compressed file, damaging the first bit cor-
rupts everything and leaves you with only a 50% chance of
getting all the bits right and a 50% chance of getting them
all wrong. Clearly, the information encoded by the bits in the
compressed file is more than the sum of its parts, highlighting
a link between data compression and Tononi’s (2008) concept
of integrated information.
In the following section we formally prove that, given the
Partial Information Decomposition (Williams & Beer, 2010)
formulation of synergy, the amount of integrated informa-
tion an information-lossless process produces on statistically
independent inputs is equivalent to the data compression it
achieves.
We begin with a brief description of algorithmic informa-
tion theory (see Li and Vitya´nyi, 2008, for more details). We
use strings to refer to finite binary sequence, i.e. an element
of set 2<ω. Any finite object can be encoded into a string
in some natural way. We are interested in effective descrip-
tions of strings (i.e. computable by a universal computer i.e.
Turing machine) . For a string x, its (plain) Kolmogorov com-
plexity C(x) is the length of the shortest effective description
of x. More formally, fix a universal Turing machine U . C(x)
is the length of the shortest program x∗ such that U on input
x∗ outputs x. It can be shown that the value of C(x) does not
depend on the choice of U up to an additive constant. C(x) is
the amount of algorithmic information contained in x. A ran-
dom string is a string x that cannot be compressed, e.g. such
that C(x) is at least the length of x.
For two strings x,y the conditional Kolmogorov complex-
ity C(x|y) of x given y is the size of the shortest program
q such that U on input p and provided y as an extra in-
put, outputs x. The information x has about y is defined as
I(x : y) =C(x)−C(x|y) =+ C(y)−C(y|x), where =+ means
equal up to a O(1) (constant) term. The idea of C-based syn-
ergy (Griffith, 2014) is to define four intuitive slices of the
C-information of the function m : (x1,x2) 7→ y.
1. R: the amount of the C-information strings x1 and x2 con-
vey redundantly about y, or, equivalently, the amount of
data compression that y achieves assuming statistically in-
dependent inputs
2. U1: the amount of C-information that only string x1 con-
veys about y.
3. U2: the amount of C-information that only string x2 con-
veys about y.
4. S: the amount of C-information the concatenation string,
(x1,x2) conveys about y not conveyed by either x1 or x2.
From the Partial Information Decomposition framework
(Williams & Beer, 2010), we have the following equalities
relating the nonnegative scalars R, U1, U2, and S:
R+U1 = I(x1 : y)
R+U2 = I(x2 : y)
R+U1 +U2 + S = I(x1,x2 : y) .
First, using the three equalities above we can define an easy
expression for the synergy minus the redundancy,
I(x1,x2 : y)− I(x1 : y)− I(x2 : y) = S−R .
Theorem 1 Given C(x1,x2|y) = 0, then S ≤ R with equality
when I(x1 : x2) = 0.
Proof. Using the prior expression we expand the three C-
information slices into their respective C-entropies.
S−R = I(x1,x2 : y)− I(x1 : y)− I(x2 : y)
=C(x1,x2)−C(x1)−C(x2)−C(x1,x2|y)+C(x1|y)+
C(x2|y).
Given that C(x1,x2|y) = 0, we know likewise that C(x1|y) =
C(x2|y) = 0; we simplify the above,
S−R =C(x1,x2)−C(x1)−C(x2)
=C(x1)+C(x2|x1)−C(x1)−C(x2)
=−I(x1 : x2).
From the above we have,
S = R− I(x1 : x2) .
Which entails S ≤ R with equality when I(x1 : x2) = 0. ⊓⊔
The above result shows that synergy (i.e. integrated infor-
mation) is equivalent to redundancy (i.e. data compression)
for lossless functions operating on statistically independent
inputs. However, an obstacle remains to expressing synergy
in this format. Although Griffith’s (2014) formulation of syn-
ergy identifies the link with data compression, giving a def-
inition of the C-information slices R,U1,U2,S based on C-
complexity is not trivial.
To quantify synergy for lossless functions using C-
complexity, Tononi’s (2008) definition of integrated infroma-
tion must be somehow translated from its original operational
framework of Shannon information theory to that of algorith-
mic information theory. We now show that the most natural
way of performing this translation does not succeed.
Suppose the synergy of function (x,y) 7→ z is defined as
S0(x,y : z) =C(z|x)+C(z|y)−C(z|xy)−C(z|x∩ y)
where C(z|x∩ y) is the shortest program that outputs z given
advice x or y, (i.e. the program outputs z on any of the two
advices x or y). The following result shows that, using this
definition, the concatenation function turns out to have high
S0 synergy, which is anomalous.
Theorem 2 Consider the concatenation function z(x,y) =
xy. Then z is a lossless function of S0 synergy |z|/2.
Proof. Pick two independent n/2-bit random strings x,y start-
ing with 0 resp. 1 i.e. x = 0 . . ., y = 1 . . . and C(x|y) = n/2
and C(y|x) = n/2.
By definition of synergy
S0(x,y : z) =C(z|x)+C(z|y)−C(z|xy)−C(z|x∩ y)
where the first two terms are n/2, the third is O(1), and the
last is n/2 because of the following program p. p is an O(1)
instructions part followed by the bitwise XOR of x,y denoted
w, i.e. n/2+O(1) bits total. Instructions: Given advice a,
XOR a with w to obtain d. If d starts with 0 output da, else
output ad. So when a = x, d = y and we output ad = xy.
Similarly when a = y then d = x and we output da = xy, i.e.
C(z|x∩ y) = n/2. ⊓⊔
In the following section, we outline an alternative strategy
for defining integrated information using C-complexity.
Quantifying Integration Using Edit Distance
If data is optimally compressed then it becomes extremely
difficult to edit in its compressed state. For example, imagine
a compressed encoding of a Wikipedia page. You want to edit
the first word on the page. But where is this word encoded in
the compressed file? There is no easily delineated set of bits
which corresponds to the first word and nothing else. Instead,
the whole set of data has been integrated, with every bit from
the original file depending on all the others. To discern the
impact that the first word has had on the compressed encod-
ing you have to understand the compression. There are no
shortcuts.
To formalize integrated information as data compression
we consider a stimulus, first in its raw unintegrated state, and
second, encoded in its integrated state within the brain. The
level of integration is equivalent to the difficulty of identify-
ing the raw information and editing it within its integrated
state.
In the following definition z and z¯ are the raw stimulus
and the brain encoded stimulus. We consider the difficulty
of editing z into z′, for example, editing the smell of choco-
late to turn it into the smell of lavender. If this operation
is performed on a raw, unintegrated dataset then the task is
straight-forward: the bits that differ are simply altered. Con-
sider, however, the challenge for the neurosurgeon operating
on Amy’s brain. If the stimulus has not been widely inte-
grated then the neurosurgeon can concentrate on a single lo-
calised area of her brain and hopefully the encoding will be
overt, reflecting the original unintegrated format in which the
information was originally transmitted. However, if the stim-
ulus has been successfully integrated (i.e. compressed) then
its encoding will reflect the overlap of patterns between it and
the entire contents of Amy’s brain. Its representation will be
widely distributed, with effects on all kinds of other memo-
ries, making it impossible to isolate and edit.
We quantify the integration of an encoding process oper-
ating on a stimulus as the minimum informational distance
between the original state of the encoded stimulus and any
possible edited state. If every state is completely different to
the original, then the integration is 1; if there exists an edited
state which is only trivially removed, the integration is 0.
For example, when an image on a digital camera is altered,
the informational distance between the camera’s original and
edited state is small. In contrast, the neurosurgeon strug-
gles to edit the memories in Amy’s brain: changing even the
slightest detail requires the contents of her brain to be com-
pletely reconstructed. The edit distance is so great that her
original brain state is largely useless for identifying a target
edited brain state.
Formally, the edit distance of m at point z is a number be-
tween 0 and 1 that measures the level of integration of m(z).
It is measured by looking at all strings z′ similar to z, and
finding the one that minimizes the ratio of length of the short-
est description of m(z) given m(z′) to the length of shortest
description of m(z). The smallest ratio obtained is the edit
distance. Since the numerator is always positive and less or
equal to the denominator, the edit distance is between 0 and
1. This edit distance quantifies information integration for
lossless functions.
Definition 1 The edit distance of m at point z is given by
min
z′ 6=z:C(z|z′)≤log |z|
{
C(m(z)|m(z′))
C(m(z))
}.
On the Computability of Integration
In this section we prove an interesting result using the above
definition, namely that lossless information integration can-
not be achieved by a computable process.
According to the integrated information theory, when we
think of another person as conscious we are viewing them as
a completely integrated and unified information processing
system, with no feasible means of disintegrating their con-
scious cognition into disjoint components. We assume that
their behaviour calls into play all of their memories and re-
flects full coordination of their sensory input. We now prove
that this form of complete integration cannot be modelled
computationally.
An integrating function’s output is such that the informa-
tion of its two (or more) inputs is completely integrated. More
formally,
Definition 2 A 1-1 function m : z = (z1,z2) 7→ z¯ is integrating
if for any strings z 6= z′, C(z¯′ | z¯)≥C(z¯′)−C(z′ | z).
i.e, the knowledge of m(z) does not help to describe m(z′),
when z and z′ are close.
Theorem 3 No integrating function is computable.
Proof. Suppose m is a computable integrating function. Let
z be a random string, i.e. such that C(z) ≥ |z|. Let z′ be
the string obtained by flipping the first bit of z. We have
C(z′ | z) = O(1). Consider the following program for z¯′ given
z¯: Cycle through all strings until the unique z is found such
that m(z) = z¯. Compute z′ by flipping the first bit of z. Com-
pute z¯′ = m(z′).
Since m is computable, the program above is of constant
size i.e., C(z¯′ | z¯) = O(1). Also C(z¯′) =+ C(z′) =+ C(z)≥ |z|
because m is computable, 1-1 and by choice of z.
Because m is integrating, we have C(z¯′ | z¯) ≥ C(z¯′)−
C(z′ | z) = |z|−O(1), a contradiction. ⊓⊔
The implications of this proof are that we have to abandon
either the idea that people enjoy genuinely unitary conscious-
ness or that brain processes can be modelled computationally.
If a person’s behaviour is totally resistant to disintegration
(i.e. we cannot analyse it independently from the rest of their
cognition), then it implies that something is going on in their
brain that is so complex it cannot feasibly be reversed. In line
with this view, Bringsjord and Zenzen (1997) specifically ar-
gue that the difference between cognition and computation is
that computation is reversible whereas cognition is not. For
instance, it is impossible for the neurosurgeon to operate on
Amy’s brain and directly edit her conscious memories, be-
cause the process of integration is irreversibly complex.
Yet Amy’s brain is a physical causal system which fol-
lows the laws of physics. Information flows into Amy’s brain
conducted by nerve impulses and gets processed by neu-
rons through biochemical signalling. Whatever information-
lossless changes result should theoretically be reversible. To
argue otherwise seems to suggest that a form of magic is go-
ing on in the brain, which is beyond computational modelling.
McGinn (1991) points out that intractable complexity of
the mind does not necessarily require the brain to transcend
the laws of physics: instead, the intractability can have an ob-
server specific source. He argues that the mind-body problem
is cognitively closed to humans in the same way that quantum
mechanics is closed to a zebra. This perspective, known as
‘new mysterianism’, maintains that the hard problem of con-
sciousness stems, not from a supernatural process, but from
natural limits in how humans form concepts.
Similarly, the apparent unitary nature of consciousness
does not require a mystical process of integration which tran-
scends physical computability. Our result merely establishes
a link between integration and irreversibility, the cause of
which can be due to limitations in the observer’s perspec-
tive. While we intuitively assume that consciousness must
be a fundamental property as defined from a God’s eye per-
spective, the attribution of this property always takes place in
a social context. When people attribute consciousness to a
system they are acknowledging a subjective inability to break
it down into a set of independent components, forcing them
to treat its actions as the behaviour of a unified, integrated
whole. The irreversibilty here is observer-centric, as opposed
to absolute. Rather than establishing a new property of con-
sciousness, our result can therefore be interpreted as merely
clarifying what is meant by the use of this concept. Specif-
ically, conscious behaviour is that which is resistant to our
best attempts at decomposition.
Neuroscientific Modelling
An alternative account is simply that consciousness does not
exist: the unitary appearance of people’s behaviour is recog-
nizable as an illusion. Dennett (1991) adopts this perspective
with his multiple drafts model. He views consciousness as
being inherently decomposable, criticizing the idea of what
he calls the ‘Cartesian theatre’, a point where all of the infor-
mation processing in the brain is integrated. Dennett presents
consciousness as a succession of multiple drafts, a process
in constant flux, without central organization or irreversible
binding.
Could neuroscience provide us with a mechanical model
of human behaviour that supersedes the value of attributing
consciousness, as Dennett (1991) suggests? It sometimes
arises that a system to which we have previously attributed
unitary consciousness is subsequently recognized as follow-
ing mechanical rules. For example, when conversing with
a chatbot, we might suddenly notice that its responses can
be predicted solely on the basis on the preceding sentence.
We then adopt the superior rule-based model and cease to at-
tribute consciousness.
Ultimately, for consciousness to be revealed as an illusion,
people would have to agree that neuroscientific modelling
succeeds in disintegrating every aspect of behaviour. Note
that the key word here is ‘people’: people would have to
agree. Arguably, the ultimate standard that we have for mea-
surement depends on the notion of other observers, which
are themselves integrated, unified wholes. For this reason,
Maguire and Maguire (2011) speculate that future develop-
ments in information theory will recognize the intractable
complexity of the mind as a key concept supporting the no-
tion of objectivity in measurement, a shift which would un-
dermine the meaningfulness of the goal to ‘understand’ the
mind.
Scramble In, Scramble Out
Assuming integrated consciousness is a genuine phe-
nomenon, its noncomputability has interesting implications
for what has to happen in the brain. When stimuli are picked
up by the brain they enter at disintegrated locations. For ex-
ample, visual stimuli enter through the optic nerve and are
processed initially by the primary visual cortex. When a vi-
sual stimulus is encoded in the occipital lobe it clearly has not
yet been integrated with the rest of cognition. For instance,
Stanely, Li and Dan (1999) analysed an array of electrodes
embedded in the thalamus lateral geniculate nucleus area of a
cat and were able to decode the signals to generate watchable
movies of what the cat was observing.
Similarly, the initiation of action must be localised in par-
ticular areas of the brain which control the relevant mus-
cles. This readiness potential must detach from the rest of
the brain’s processing and hence is no longer integrated. For
example, following up on Libet’s original experiments, Siong
Soon et al. (2008) demonstrated that, by monitoring activ-
ity in the frontopolar prefrontal cortex they could predict a
participant’s decision to move their right or left hand several
seconds before the participant became aware of it.
However, if integration is necessary for consciousness,
then somewhere between the stimulus entering the brain and
the decision leaving the brain, there is a point where the in-
formation cannot be fully disentangled from the rest of cog-
nition. This integrated processing cannot be localised to any
part of the brain or any specific point in time. The contents of
cognition are effectively unified. We label this idea ‘scramble
in, scramble out’ to reflect the irreversible integration and dis-
integration that must occur between observation and action.
The aspects of cognition that have been clarified by neu-
roscience so far tend to involve processing before scram-
ble in or after scramble out. For example, it is well estab-
lished that the occipital lobe is involved in visual process-
ing or that the prefrontal cortex encodes future actions before
they are performed. These components are modular in that
they have specialised, encapsulated, evolutionarily developed
functions. However, somewhere between input and output
there must also be a binding process of integration that no
computational modelling can disentangle.
Fodor (2001) summarizes as follows: “Local mental pro-
cesses appear to accommodate pretty well to Turing’s theory
that thinking is computation; they appear to be largely modu-
lar...By contrast, what we’ve found out about global cognition
is mainly that it is different from the local kind...we deeply
do not understand it”. While neuroscience might shed light
on the input and output functions of the brain, the quantifi-
cation for integrated information we have presented here im-
plies that it will be unable to shed light on the complex tangle
that is core consciousness.
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